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Abstract
We describe the voting farm, a tool which implements a distributed software
voting mechanism for a number of parallel message passing systems. The tool,
developed in the framework of EFTOS (Embedded Fault-Tolerant Supercom-
puting), can be used in stand-alone mode or in conjunction with other EFTOS
fault tolerance tools. In the former case, we describe how the mechanism can be
exploited, e.g., to implement restoring organs (N-modular redundancy systems
with N-replicated voters); in the latter case, we show how it is possible for the
user to implement in an easy and effective way a number of different recovery
strategies via a custom, high-level language. Combining such strategies with the
basic fault masking capabilities of the voting tool makes it possible to set up
complex fault-tolerant systems such as, for instance, N-and-M-spare systems or
gracefully degrading voting farms. We also report about the impact that our tool
can have on reliability, and we show how, besides structural design goals like
fault transparency, our tool achieves replication transparency, a high degree of
flexibility and ease-of-use, and good performance.
2
1 Introduction
We herein describe the EFTOS voting farm (VF), a class of C functions implementing
a distributed software voting mechanism developed in the framework of the ESPRIT-
IV project 21012 EFTOS (Embedded Fault-Tolerant Supercomputing) [1, 2].
VF can be considered both as a stand-alone tool for fault masking, and as a basic
block in a more complex fault tolerance structure set up within the EFTOS fault tol-
erance framework. Accordingly, we first draw, in Sect. 2, the design and the structure
of the stand-alone voting farm, as a means for orchestrating redundant resources with
fault transparency as primary goal. There, we also describe how the user can exploit
the stand-alone VF tool to straightforwardly set up systems consisting of redundant
modules and based on voters, e.g., restoring organs (or N-modular redundancy sys-
tems with N-replicated voters). We also report about the fault model of our tool.
In a second step (Sect. 3) we concentrate on the special extra features that VF
can inherit when run as a fully EFTOS-compliant tool. To this end we describe the
EFTOS fault tolerance layers and show how it is possible to make use of them in order
to couple the fault masking capabilities of VF with the fault tolerance capabilities of
some EFTOS tool—for instance, adding spares to an NMR system or allowing a voting
farm to gracefully degrade in the presence of unrecoverable faults—and we analyse
in a special case the impact that this approach can have on reliability. In the same
Section we also deal with other features that can be inherited by VF from the EFTOS
framework, e.g., the availability of a presentation layer for hypermedia monitoring and
fault-injection.
Section 4 deals with the impact on reliability.
Section 5 deals with the analysis of the performance of VF and reports also on
resource consumption and some optimisations.
Section 6 concludes this work summarizing the current state of the tool. There
we also briefly describe a case study where VF has been used in developing the soft-
ware stable storage device for the High Voltage Substations (HVS) of ENEL, the main
Italian electricity supplier.
2 Basic structure and features of the EFTOS voting farm
A well-known approach to achieve fault masking and therefore to hide the occurrence
of faults is the N-modular redundancy technique (NMR), valid both on hardware and
at software level. To overcome the shortcoming of having one voter, whose failure
leads to the failure of the whole system even when each and every other module is still
running correctly, it is possible to use N replicas of the voter and to provide N copies
of the inputs to each replica, as described in Fig.1. This approach exhibits among
others the following properties:
1. Depending on the voting technique adopted in the voter, the occurrence of a lim-
ited number of faults in the inputs to the voters may be masked to the subsequent
modules [3]; for instance, by using majority voting, up to ⌈N/2⌉ − 1 faults can
be made transparent.
2. If we consider a pipeline of such systems, then a failing voter in one stage of the
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Figure 1: A restoring organ, i.e., a N-modular redundant system with N voters, when
N = 3.
pipeline can be simply regarded as a corrupted input for the next stage, where it
will be restored.
The resulting system is easily recognizable to be more robust than plain NMR, as it
exhibits no single-point-of-failure. Dependability analysis confirms intuition. Property
2. in particular explains why such systems are also known as “restoring organs” [4].
From the point of view of software engineering, this system though has two major
drawbacks:
• Each module in the NMR must be aware of and responsible for interacting with
the whole set of voters;
• The complexity of these interactions, which is a function increasing quadrati-
cally with N , the cardinality of the voting farm, burdens each module in the
NMR.
The two above observations have been recognized by us as serious impairments
to our design goals, which included replication transparency, ease of use, and flexibil-
ity [5].
In order to reach the full set of our requirements, we slightly modified the design of
the system as described in Fig. 2: In this new picture each module only has to interact
with, and be aware of one voter, regardless the value of N . Moreover, the complexity
of such a task is fully shifted to the voter, i.e., transparent to the user.
The basic component of our tool is therefore the voter (see Fig.3) which we define
as follows:
A voter is a local software module connected to one user module and to
a farm of fully interconnected fellows. Attribute “local” means that both
user module and voter run on the same processing node.
As a consequence of the above definition, the user module has no other interlocutor
than its voter, whose tasks are completely transparent to the user module. It is therefore
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Figure 2: Structure of the EFTOS voting farm mechanism for a NMR system with
N = 3 (the well-known triple modular redundancy system, or TMR).
User
Module Voter
Node
Figure 3: A user module and its voter. The latter is the only member of the farm of
which the user module should be aware of: from his/her point of view, messages will
only flow between these two ends. This has been designed so to minimize the burden
of the user module and to keep it free to continue undisturbed as much as possible.
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possible to model the whole system as a simple client-server application: on each user
module the same client protocol applies (see Sect. 2.1) while the same server protocol
is executed on every instance of the voter (see Sect. 2.2).
2.1 Client-Side of the Voting Farm: the User Module
Table 1 gives an example of the client-side protocol to be executed on each processing
node of the system in which a user module runs: a well-defined, ordered list of actions
has to take place so that the voting farm be coherently declared and defined, described,
activated, controlled, and queried: In particular, describing a farm stands for creating
a static map of the allocation of its components; activating a farm substantially means
spawning the local voter (Sect. 2.2 will shed more light on this); controlling a farm
means requesting its service by means of control and data messages; finally, a voting
farm can also be queried about its state, the current voted value, etc.
As already mentioned, the above steps have to be carried out in the same way
on each user module: this coherency is transparently supported in Single-Process,
Multiple-Data (SPMD) architectures. This is the case, for instance, of Parsytec EPX
(Embedded Parallel eXtensions to UNIX, see, e.g., [6, 7]) whose “initial load mech-
anism” transparently runs the same executable image of the user application on each
processing node of the user partition.
This protocol is available to the user as a class-like collection of functions dealing
with opaque objects referenced through pointers. A tight resemblance with the FILE
set of functions of the standard C language library [8] has been sought so to shorten as
much as possible the user’s learning time—the API and usage of VF closely resemble
those of FILE (see Table 2).
VF has been crafted out using the CWEB system of structured documentation [9],
which we found to be an envaluable tool both at design and at development time [10].
2.2 Server-Side of the Voting Farm: the Voter
The local voter thread represents the server-side of the voting farm. After the set
up of the static description of the farm (Table 1, Step 3) in the form of an ordered
list of processing node identifiers (positive integer numbers), the server-side of our
application is launched by the user by means of the VF run() function. This turns the
static representation of a farm into an “alive” (running) object, the voter thread.
This latter connects to its user module via inter-process communication means
(“local links”) and to the rest of the farm via synchronous, blocking channels (“virtual
links”). We assume the availability of a means to send and to receive messages across
these links—let us call these functions Send() and Receive(). Furthermore, we as-
sume that Send() blocks the caller until the communication system has fully delivered
the specified message to the specified (single) recipient, while Receive() blocks the
caller until the communication system has fully transported a message directed to the
caller, or until a user-specified timeout has expired.
Once the connection is established, and in the absence of faults, the voter reacts
to the arrival of the user messages as a finite-state automaton: in particular, the ar-
rival of input messages triggers a number of broadcasts among the voters—as shown
in Fig.4—which are managed through the distributed algorithm described in Table 3.
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Figure 4: The “local” input value has to be broadcast to N − 1 fellows, and N −
1 “remote” input values have to be collected from each of the fellows. The voting
algorithm takes place as soon as a complete set of values is available.
7
Assumptions of that algorithm are fail/stop behaviour and a partially synchronous sys-
tem such that upper bounds are known for communication delays. This last assumption
is rather realistic at least in parallel environments like EPX, which are equipped with
a fast communication subsystem for their own use, so that processors do not have to
compete “too much” for the network. Such subsytem also offers a reliable communi-
cation means and allows to transparently tolerate faults like, e.g., the break of a link,
or a router’s failure.
When faults occur and affect up to M < N voters, no arrival for more than ∆t
time units is interpreted as an error. As a consequence, variable input messages is
incremented as if a message had arrived, and its faulty state is recorded. This way we
can tolerate up to M < N errors at the cost of M∆t time units. Note that even though
this algorithm tolerates up to N − 1 faults, the voting algorithm may be intrinsically
able to cope with much less than that: for instance, majority voting fails in the presence
of faults affecting ⌈N/2⌉ or more voters. As another example, algorithms computing
a weighted average of the input values consider all items whose “faulty bit” is set as
zero-weight values, automatically discarding them from the average. This of course
may also lead to imprecise results as the number of faults gets larger.
Besides the input value, which represents a request for voting, the user module may
send to its voter a number of other requests—some of these are used in Table 1, Step
5. In particular, the user can choose to adopt a voting algorithm among the following
ones:
• Formalized majority voting technique,
• Generalized median voting technique,
• Formalized plurality voting technique,
• Weighted averaging technique,
• Consensus,
the first four items being the voting techniques that were generalized in [3] to “arbitrary
N-version systems with arbitrary output types using a metric space framework.” To use
these algorithms, a metric function can be supplied by the user when he/she “opens”
the farm (Table 1, Step 2, function objcmp()): this is exactly the same approach used
in opaque C functions like e.g., bsearch() or qsort() [8]. A default metric function is
also available.
The choice of the algorithm, as well as other control choices are managed via
function VF control(), which takes as argument a voting farm pointer plus a variable
number of control argument—in Table 1, Step 5, these arguments are an input message,
a virtual link for the output vote, an algorithm identifier, plus an argument for that
algorithm.
Other requests include the setting of some algorithmic parameters and the removal
of the voting farm (function VF close()).
The voters’ replies to the incoming requests are straightforward. In particular, a
VF DONE message is sent to the user module when a broadcast has been performed;
for the sake of avoiding deadlocks, one can only close a farm after the VF DONE
message has been sent. Any failed attempt causes the voter to send a VF REFUSED
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message. The same refusing message is sent when the user tries to initiate a new voting
session sooner than the conclusion of the previous session.
Note how function VF get() (Table 1, Step 6) simply sets the caller in a waiting
state from which it exits either on a message arrival or on the expiration of a time-out.
2.3 Fault Model
VF can deal with the following classes of faults [11]:
• physical as well as human-made,
• accidental as well as intentional,
• development as well as operational,
• internal and external faults,
• permanent and temporary,
as long as the corresponding failure domain consists only of value failures. Timing
errors are also considered, though the delay must not be larger than some bounded
value. The tool is only capable of dealing with one fault at a time—the tool is ready to
deal with other new faults only after having recovered from the present one. Consistent
value errors are tolerated. Under this assumption, arbitrary in-code value errors may
occur (the adopted metric approach is not able to deal with non-code values).
3 The voting farm as a fully EFTOS-compliant tool
The above section describes VF as a stand-alone tool. One of the consequences of this
strategy is the adoption of fault masking as a means to make some faults transparent,
e.g., via NMR-systems. In this Section we now shift the attention to a more general
approach towards tolerating faults which has been defined as the object of the ESPRIT
project EFTOS. We show in particular how the conjoint use of VF and of the EFTOS
framework may yield systems that combine more than one fault tolerance technique,
and as such are more dependable.
To this end, we first introduce EFTOS and its framework, then we describe how to
make use of its extra features. Section 4 investigates on the impact that this version of
VF can have on reliability in a special case.
3.1 EFTOS and its Framework
The overall object of the ESPRIT-IV Project 21012 EFTOS [1, 2] (Embedded Fault-
Tolerant Supercomputing) has been to set up a software framework for integrating
fault tolerance into embedded distributed high-performance applications in a flexible,
effective, and straightforward way. The EFTOS framework has been first implemented
on a Parsytec CC system [7], a distributed-memory MIMD supercomputer consisting
of processing nodes based on PowerPC 604 microprocessors at 133MHz, dedicated
high-speed links, I/O modules, and routers. As part of the Project, this framework has
been then ported to a Microsoft Windows NT / Intel PentiumPro platform and to a TEX
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/ DEC Alpha platform [12, 13] so to fulfill the requirements of the EFTOS application
partners. We herein constantly refer to the version running on the CC system and its
operating system, a UNIX-dialect called EPX/nK (Parsytec’s nano-kernel version of
EPX.)
The main characteristics of the CC system are the adoption of the thread process-
ing model and of the message passing communication model: communicating threads
exchange messages through a proprietary message passing library called EPX [6]. The
hypotheses on the target communication system we drew in Sect. 2.2 follow closely
the peculiar characteristics of EPX. In particular, EPX adopts the concepts of local
and virtual links, and its Send() and Receive() are compliant with what is required in
Sect. 2.2.
Through the adoption of the EFTOS framework, the target embedded parallel ap-
plication is plugged into a hierarchical, layered system (see Fig. 5) whose structure
and basic components are:
• At the base level, a distributed net of “servers” whose main task is mimicking
possibly missing (with respect to the POSIX standards) operating system func-
tionalities, such as remote thread creation;
• One level upward (detection tool layer), a set of parametrisable functions man-
aging error detection (we call them “Dtools”). These basic components are
plugged into the embedded application to make it more dependable. EFTOS
supplies a number of these Dtools, e.g., a watchdog timer thread and a trap-
handling mechanism, plus an API for incorporating user-defined EFTOS-com-
pliant tools;
• At the third level (control layer), a distributed application called DIR net (de-
tection, isolation, and recovery network) [14] is available to coherently combine
the Dtools, to ensure consistent strategies throughout the whole system, and to
play the role of a backbone handling information to and from the fault tolerance
elements.
The DIR net can also be regarded as a fault-tolerant network of crash-failure
detectors, connected to other peripheral error detectors. It can be used as a gen-
eral toolset in which fundamental distributed algorithms like, e.g., those drawn
in [15], can be implemented;
• At the fourth level (application layer), the Dtools and the components of the DIR
net are combined into dependable mechanisms i.e., methods to guarantee fault-
tolerant communication, stable storage devices [17], the voting farm mechanism,
etc;
• The highest level (presentation layer) is given by a hypermedia distributed ap-
plication based on standard World-Wide Web technology and on Tcl/Tk [18],
which renders the structure and the state of the user application [19].
An important feature of the above sketched layered system is the ability to execute
user-defined recovery strategies:
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Figure 5: The structure of the EFTOS framework. Light gray has been used for the
operating system and the user application, while dark gray layers pertain EFTOS.
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3.2 The EFTOS Recovery Language
Apart from its main role of backbone of the EFTOS fault tolerance framework, the
DIR net also coordinates a virtual machine, called the recovery interpreter (RINT for
short), meant to execute user-defined recovery strategies which are available at this
level as a set of recovery opcodes (r-codes for short) [16].
A special high-level language has been set up, called Recovery Language (RL), by
means of which the user can compose custom-made recovery strategies. Strategies are
then translated into the lower level r-codes by means of a translator.
A RL specification is a collection of isolation, reconfiguration, and recovery ac-
tions guarded by selective conditions (IF’s). Recovery actions include rebooting or
shutting down a node, killing or restarting a thread or a logical group of threads, send-
ing warnings to single or grouped threads, and functions to purge error-records from
the database of the DIR net.
The scheme works as follows: the user writes with RL a recovery strategy, viz. a
specification of some actions to be taken to tackle each particular error condition as
that error is detected. For each error, the DIR net awakes the RINT thread, which inter-
prets the r-code equivalent of the RL source, looking for fulfilled conditions, possibly
accessing the system database maintained by the DIR net. Once a condition is met, the
corresponding actions are executed, which are supposed to be able to tackle the error.
A default action is also available in case no IF is evaluated as true. The whole strategy
is depicted in Fig. 6.
During the lifetime of the application, this framework guards it from a series of
possible deviations from the expected activity; this is done either by executing detec-
tion, isolation, and reconfiguration tasks, or by means of fault masking—this latter
being provided by the EFTOS voting farm, which we are going to describe in the
Section to follow.
As a last remark, the EFTOS framework appears to the user as a library of functions
written in the C programming language.
3.3 Using the Voting Farm in Conjunction with the EFTOS Framework
What we described in Sect. 2 might be referred to as “the Voting Farm in stand-alone
mode”, i.e., unplugged from its originating environment, the EFTOS framework. Here
we describe further capabilities and features that are offered to the user of our tool
when run as part of a fully EFTOS-compliant application.
When used in conjunction with the EFTOS DIR net, each voter is transparently
connected to a DIR net component and to a watch-dog timer Dtool, connected in turn
to the DIR net. This way the DIR net is informed of errors affecting the voters. Each
voter also directly informs the DIR net of its state transitions (we call them “phases”)
by sending phase-identifiers (pids) that can assume one of the following values:
VFP INIT, that is, the voter is waiting for the first input value from the user,
VFP BROADCAST, meaning the voter is currently broadcasting the input value to
its fellows,
VFP VOTING, i.e., the voter has entered the voting function,
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Figure 6: A global view of an RL program: the user supplies an RL source code; the
rl translator turns it into binary r-codes; the r-codes are interpreted at run time by the
RINT thread within the DIR net.
VFP SUCCESS, i.e., an output vote has been produced and the voter is back in its
waiting state;
VFP FAILURE, which means the voting function was not able to produce an output
vote.
The pid is then stored by the DIR net in its global database [14] and can be used
during the interpretation of the r-codes (see Sect. 3.2).
With RL the user can express strategies aiming for instance at substituting a sus-
pected voter with a non-faulty deputy run elsewhere in the system (see Table 4), or at
a graceful degradation of the system (e.g., by killing those voters which are in phase
VFP FAILURE; see Table 5). Other strategies are up to the user.
Another feature that can be inherited by VF when used as part of the EFTOS frame-
work comes from its presentation layer: the farm can be monitored via the EFTOS
visualization tool [19], a hypermedia distributed application which remotely pilots a
World-Wide Web browser so to render the structure and the outcome of the voting
sessions.
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4 Impact on Reliability
Reliability can be greatly improved by this technique. For instance, using Markov
models, under the assumption of independence between faults occurrence, it is possible
to show that, let R(t) be the reliability of a single, non-replicated component, then
R(0)(t) = 3R(t)2 − 2R(t)3, (1)
i.e., the equation expressing the reliability of a TMR system, can be considerably im-
proved by adding one spare, even in the case of non-perfect error detection coverage.
This is the equation resulting from the Markov model in Fig. 7, expressed as a function
of error recovery coverage (C , defined as the probability associated with the process
of identifying the failed module out of those available and being able to switch in the
spare [4]) and time (t):
R(1)(C, t) = (−3C2 + 6C)× [R(t)(1 −R(t))]2 +R(0)(t). (2)
Appendix A gives some mathematical details on Eq. (2).
Adding more spares obviously implies further improving reliability. In general we
can think of a class of monotonically increasing reliability functions,
(R(M)(C, t))
M>0, (3)
corresponding to systems adopting N + M replicas. Depending on both cost and
reliability requirements, the user can choose the most-suited values for M and N .
Fig. 8 compares Eq. (1) and (2) in the general case (left picture) and under perfect
coverage (right picture). In this latter case, the reliability of a single, non-redundant
system is also portrayed. Note furthermore how the crosspoint between the three-
and-one-spare system and the non-redundant system is considerably lower than the
crosspoint between this latter and the TMR system—R(t) ≈ 0.2324 vs. R(t) = 0.5.
The reliability of the system can therefore be increased from the one of a pure NMR
system to that of N-and-M-spare systems (see Fig. 8).
5 Performance of the Voting Farm
This Section first focuses on estimating the voting delay via some experiments. Then
it summarises the overheads in terms of system resources (threads, memory, links. . . )
Finally it briefly sketches a formal model used to evaluate the broadcast algorithm in
Table 3 and reports on some analytical results out of it.
5.1 Time and Resources Overheads of the Voting Farm.
All measurements have been performed running a restoring organ consisting of N
processing nodes, N = 1, . . . , 4. The executable file has been obtained on a Parsytec
CC system with the ancc C compiler using the -O optimization flag. During the trials
the CC system was fully dedicated to the execution of that application.
The application has been executed in four runs, each of which has been repeated
fifty times, increasing the number of voters from 1 to 4, one voter per node. Wall-clock
times have been collected. Averages and standard deviations are shown in Table 6.
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Figure 7: Markov reliability model for a TMR-and-1-spare system. λ is the failure
rate, C is the error recovery coverage factor. ‘Fail safe’ state is reached when the
system is no more able to correctly perform its function, though the problem has been
safely detected and handled properly. In ‘Fail unsafe,’ on the contrary, the system is
incorrect, though the problem has not been handled or detected. Every other state is
labeled with three digits, d1d2d3, such that d1 is the number of non-faulty modules in
the TMR system, d2 is the number of non-faulty spares (in this case, 0 or 1), and d3 is
the number of undetected, faulty modules. The initial state, 310, has been highlighted.
This model is solved by Eq. (2).
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Figure 8: Graphs of Eq. (1) and (2). This latter is strictly above the former in both
pictures. The right picture considers the special case of C = 1 (perfect error detection
coverage) and draws also the reliability of a single, non-redundant system.
As of the overhead in resources, N threads have to be spawned, and N local links
are needed for the communication between each user module and its local voter. The
network of voters calls for another N × (N − 1)/2 virtual links.
5.2 Optimizations
Overall performance is obviously conditioned, among other factors, by both the nature
of the broadcast algorithm as well as by the diameter of the communication network.
In particular we formally proved [20] that, in a fully synchronized, fully connected
(crossbar) system, the execution time of the algorithm we adopted can vary, depend-
ing on the permutation of the sequence of Send()’s which constitute the broadcast,
from O(N2) (identity permutation) to O(N) (one-cycled permutation). In the case of
the one-cycled permutation, we showed that the efficiency of the channel system is
constant with respect to N , and approximately equal to 66.67%.
Due to the above results, we consider as part of the process of porting VF to another
platform an optimization step in which a best-performing sequence is selected. The
user is also allowed to substitute altogether the default broadcast function with another
one.
6 Conclusions
A flexible, easy to use, efficient mechanism for software voting has been described. In
particular, it has been shown how it is possible to combine fault masking with recovery
techniques when the mechanism is coupled with other tools of the EFTOS framework.
In particular, the availability of a custom, high-level language for expressing recovery
strategies allows to decouple aspects related to fault tolerance programming from those
related to a system’s normal operation, with a profitable trade-off between the need for
transparent fault tolerance and the need to orchestrate software fault tolerance in the
application layer (see e.g., [21, 22].)
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The tool is currently available for a number of message passing environments, in-
cluding Parsytec EPX, Windows/NT, and TXT TEX. A special, “static” version has
been developed for this latter, which adopts the mailbox paradigm as opposed to mes-
sage passing via virtual links. In this latter version, the tool has been used in a software
fault tolerance implementation of a stable memory system (SMS) for the high-voltage
substation controller of ENEL, the main Italian electricity supplier [17]. This SMS is
based on a combination of temporal and spatial redundancy to tolerate both transient
and permanent faults, and uses two voting farms, one with consensus and the other
with majority voting. The tool proved to fulfill its goals and will gradually substitute
the dedicated hardware board originally implementing stable storage at ENEL.
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A Appendix: Mathematical Details
Here we describe the basic steps leading to Eq. 2. The Markov reliability model of
Fig. 7 brings to the following set of equations:


p310(t+∆t) = p310(t)(1− 4λ∆t)
p300(t+∆t) = p300(t)(1− 3λ∆t) + p310(t)4λ∆tC
p200(t+∆t) = p200(t)(1− 2λ∆t) + p300(t)3λ∆t
pFS(t+∆t) = pFS(t) + p200(t)2λ∆t
p211(t+∆t) = p211(t)(1− 3λ∆t) + p310(t)3λ∆t(1 − C)
p301(t+∆t) = p301(t)(1− 3λ∆t) + p310(t)λ∆t(1 − C)
p201(t+∆t) = p201(t)(1− 2λ∆t) + p301(t)3λ∆tC+
p211(t)3λ∆tC
p202(t+∆t) = p202(t)(1− 2λ∆t) + p301(t)3λ∆t(1 − C)+
p211(t)λ∆t(1− C)
pFU(t+∆t) = pFU(t) + p201(t)2λ∆t+
p211(t)2λ∆t(1− C) + p202(t)2λ∆t
(4)
For any state s, let us now call Ls = L(ps(t)), where L is the Laplace transform.
Furthermore, assuming (310) as the initial state we set p310(0) = 1 and ∀s 6= (310) :
ps(0) = 0. Then taking the limit of the above equations as t goes to zero and taking
the Laplace transform we get to


L310 =
1
s+4λ
L300 =
4C
s+3λ −
4C
s+4λ
L200 =
6C
s+4λ −
12C
s+3λ +
6C
s+2λ
LFS =
C
s
− 3C
s+4λ +
8C
s+3λ −
6C
s+2λ
L211 =
3(1−C)
s+3λ −
(3(1−C)
s+4λ
L301 =
1−C
s+3λ −
1−C
s+4λ
L201 = 6C(1−C)(
1
s+4λ −
2
s+3λ +
1
s+2λ)
L202 = 3(1− C)
2( 1
s+4λ −
2
s+3λ +
1
s+2λ)
(5)
Inverting the Laplace transform we now get to


p310(t) = e
−4λt
p300(t) = 4Ce
−3λt − 4Ce−4λt
p200(t) = 6Ce
−4λt − 12Ce−3λt + 6Ce−2λt
p211(t) = 3(1 − C)e
−3λt − 3(1 −C)e−4λt
p301(t) = (1− C)e
−3λt − (1− C)e−4λt
p201(t) = 6C(1− C)(e
−4λt − 2e−3λt + e−2λt)
p202(t) = 3(1 − C)
2(e−4λt − 2e−3λt + e−2λt)
(6)
(Only useful states have been computed.)
Let us call R = e−λt the reliability of the basic component of the system, and
RTMR the reliability of the TMR system based on the same component. The relia-
bility of the three and one spare system, R(1)(C, t), is given by the sum of the above
probabilities:
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R(1)(C, t) = R
4(−3C2 + 6C) +R3(6c2 − 12C − 2) +R2(−3C2 + 6C + 3)
= (−3C2 + 6C)(R(1 −R))2 + (3R2 − 2R3)
= (−3C2 + 6C)(R(1 −R))2 +RTMR,
which proves Eq. (2).
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1 /* declaration */
VotingFarm t *vf;
2 /* definition */
vf ← VF open(objcmp);
3 /* description */
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N} : VF add(vf, nodei, identi);
4 /* activation */
VF run(vf);
5 /* control */
VF control(vf, VF input(obj, sizeof(VFobj t)),
VF output(link),
VF algorithm (VFA WEIGHTED AVERAGE),
VF scaling factor(1.0) );
6 /* query */
do {} while (VF error==VF NONE ∧ VF get(vf)==VF REFUSED);
7 /* deactivation */
VF close(vf);
Table 1: An example of usage of the voting farm.
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phase FILE class VotingFarm t class
declaration FILE* f; VotingFarm t* vf;
opening f = fopen(. . . ); vf = VF open(. . . );
control fwrite(f, . . . ); VF control(vf, . . . );
closings fclose(f); VF close(vf);
Table 2: The C language standard class for managing file is compared with the VF
class. The tight resemblance has been sought in order to shorten as much as possible
the user’s learning time.
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1 /* each voter gets a unique voter id ∈ {1, . . . , N} */
voter id ← who-am-i();
2 /* all messages are first supposed to be valid */
∀i : validi ← TRUE;
3 /* keep track of the number of received input messages */
i← input messages ← 0;
4 do {
5 /* wait for an incoming message or a timeout */
Wait Msg With Timeout(∆t);
6 /* u points to the user module’s input */
if ( Sender() ≡ USER ) u← i;
7 /* read it */
if ( ¬ Timeout ) msgi ← Receive();
8 /* or invalidate its entry */
else validi ← FALSE;
9 /* count it */
i← input messages ← input messages + 1;
10 if (voter id ≡ input messages) Broadcast(msgu);
11 } while (input messages 6= N);
Table 3: The distributed algorithm needed to regulate the right to broadcast among
the N voters. Each voter waits for a message for a time which is at most ∆t, then
it assumes a fault affected either a user module or its voter. Function Broadcast()
sends its argument to all voters whose id is different from voter id. It is managed via a
special sending thread so to circumvent the case of a possibly deadlock-prone Send().
24
INCLUDE ”vf phases.h”
IF [ -FAULTY THREAD1
OR -PHASE THREAD1 == {VFP FAILURE} ]
THEN
KILL THREAD1
START THREAD4 AND
WARN THREAD2, THREAD3
FI
Table 4: A recovery rule coded in RL. We suppose a voting farm consisting of three
threads, identified by integers 1–3. If the first thread is detected as faulty or its state
is VFP FAILURE, then that thread is killed, a new thread is started and the fellows
of the faulty one are alerted so that they restore a non-faulty farm. Three of such
rules may be used to set up, e.g., a three-and-one-spare system. (Note the INCLUDE
statement, which is used to import C-style definitions into RL. Note also the curly
brackets operator, which de-references such definitions, as in {VFP FAILURE}.)
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INCLUDE ”vf phases.h”
IF [ -FAULTY GROUP1
OR -PHASE GROUP1 == {VFP FAILURE} ]
THEN
KILL THREAD@ AND WARN THREAD∼
FI
Table 5: Another recovery rule coded in RL. We suppose a voting farm consist-
ing of three threads, collectively identified as “group 1.” The IF statement checks
whether any element of the group has been detected as faulty or is currently in
VFP FAILURE state. If so, in the first action, those that fulfill the condition (iden-
tified in RL as THREAD@) are killed, while those that do not fulfill the condition (in
RL, THREAD∼) are warned. This allows a graceful degradation of the voting farm.
26
number of nodes average standard deviation
1 0.000615 0.000006
2 0.001684 0.000022
3 0.002224 0.000035
4 0.003502 0.000144
Table 6: Time overhead of the voting farm for one to four node systems (one voter per
node). The unit is seconds.
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